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The EU’s Emissions Trading Scheme: 
A Prototype Global System? 
Denny Ellerman* 
 
Abstract 
The European Union's Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS) is the world's first multinational cap-
and-trade system for greenhouse gases. As an agreement between sovereign nations with diverse 
historical, institutional, and economic circumstances, it can be seen as a prototype for an eventual 
global climate regime. Interestingly, the problems that are often seen as dooming a global trading 
system — international financial flows and institutional readiness — haven't appeared in the EU ETS, 
at least not yet. The more serious problems that emerge from the brief experience of the EU ETS are 
those of (1) developing a central coordinating organization, (2) devising side benefits to encourage 
participation, and (3) dealing with the interrelated issues of harmonization, differentiation, and 
stringency. The pre-existing organizational structure and membership benefits of the European Union 
provided convenient and almost accidental solutions to the need for a central institution and side 
benefits, but these solutions will not work on a global scale and there are no obvious substitutes. 
Furthermore, the EU ETS is only beginning to test the practicality of harmonizing allocations within 
the trading system, differentiating responsibilities among participants, and increasing the stringency 
of emissions caps. The trial period of the EU ETS punted on these problems, as was appropriate for a 
trial period, but they are now being addressed seriously. From a global perspective, the answers that 
are being worked out in Europe will say a great deal about what will be feasible on a broader, global 
scale. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The European Union’s Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) can claim to be first in many 
respects. It is the first cap-and-trade system for greenhouse gases (GHG) and it is by far the 
largest emissions trading market yet created. These attributes alone make the EU ETS worthy of 
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study, but it is another first that provides the motivation for this paper: The EU ETS is the 
world’s first multinational cap-and-trade system. As such, it can be seen as a prototype of the 
multi-national GHG emissions trading system that is advanced as a possible architecture for an 
eventual global climate regime (Aldy and Stavins, 2008). While the EU ETS is in only its fourth 
year of existence, the experience to date provides a preview of the issues that are likely to appear 
in a global system, some useful precedents, and evidence that some problems may not be so 
difficult after all.  
1.1 Two Important Similarities 
Two features make the EU ETS appropriate for study as global prototype: the weak federal 
structure of the European Union and the significant disparities in economic circumstance, 
institutional development, and political will among the Member States. The European Union is 
not a strong federal union like the United States of America. The constituent Member States are 
independent nations that display and exercise the principal attributes of sovereignty. While some 
authority in some domains has been ceded to central European institutions, the basic decision-
making entity in the EU remains the Council of Ministers, which consists of the relevant 
ministers of the Member States with carefully negotiated voting rights. The ETS Directive 
(European Council, 2003), which provides the legal basis for the EU ETS, can be seen, like all 
EU directives, as a specialized multi-national agreement within the broader framework of the 
Treaties that have established the European Union. Although surely different in many particulars, 
a global trading regime will exhibit a similar high degree of decentralization.  
Just as the European Union can mistakenly be seen as a stronger federal structure than what 
political realities allow, so can the common adjective, European, mask a significant degree of 
diversity. The demarcation between East and West in Europe is not as marked as that between 
North and South globally, but there are instructive similarities. The difference in per capita 
income between the richest and poorest nations in the EU spans a significant part of the 
difference that would exist among the major emitting countries of the world. The per capita 
income of Romania and Bulgaria is only a third higher than that of China and one-fifth that of 
Europe’s most well-off European nation, Ireland, which has per capita income five percent 
higher than that of the United States.1  
More than a decade of concerted efforts to transform institutions to conform to Western 
European norms has diminished East-West disparities, but the success in the effort has been 
uneven and the remaining differences make participation in the EU ETS more of a challenge for 
some than for others. Even greater differences exist in political will as expressed in the priority 
given to climate measures, not only between East and West in Europe, but perhaps also between 
                                                 
1 In contrast, the difference between the U.S. states with the lowest and highest gross state product (Mississippi and 
Connecticut) is a factor of two. Luxembourg is excluded in the EU comparison because of the high concentration 
of corporate and financial activity that causes that country’s per capita GDP to be 75% higher than that of 
Ireland. Delaware is excluded from the U.S. comparison for the same reason. These comparisons are based in 
IMF statistics for 2005 using purchasing power parity exchange rates. 
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the southern and northern members of the fifteen West European nations. How all of these 
nations came to adopt a mandatory cap-and-trade system makes the EU ETS of great interest in 
considering how to bridge the differences in economic, institutional and political circumstance 
that will characterize a global regime. 
1.2 A Brief Recap of the EU ETS 
The EU ETS is a classic cap-and-trade system in that there is an absolute limit on covered 
emissions and rights to emit those emissions are conveyed by tradable permits, called European 
Union Allowances (EUAs), which are almost entirely distributed freely to affected installations 
that are obligated in turn to report their emissions and to surrender an equal number of 
allowances annually. The coverage of the EU ETS is partial in including only CO2 and only 
electricity generation and most industrial activities. Notably, transportation, buildings, the 
service sector, and agriculture are not presently included, although it was envisaged from the 
beginning that additional GHGs and sectors would be incorporated over time. As it now exists, 
the EU ETS includes about 45% of the CO2 emissions and a little less than 40% of the GHG 
emissions of the EU. 
The EU ETS was conceived in the late 1990s as a means of ensuring that the then fifteen 
members of the European Union (EU15) could meet their commitments under the Kyoto 
Protocol in the First Commitment Period (2008-12). In surprisingly short time, this idea matured 
into a cap-and-trade system featuring a three-year “trial” period from 2005 through 2007 and a 
subsequent “real” five-year trading period that coincided with the First Commitment Period and 
that was to be followed by subsequent five-year trading periods.  
More significantly, the EU ETS has grown from the original fifteen Member States to include 
thirty countries. This expansion was accomplished in three steps: the accession of ten mostly 
East European Member States to the European Union on May 1, 2004; the subsequent expansion 
of the EU to include Romania and Bulgaria at the beginning of 2007; and the inclusion of three 
of the four nations constituting the European Economic Area (Norway, Iceland, and 
Liechtenstein) beginning in 2008.  
The choice of a cap-and-trade system in Europe and the particular structure that it assumed 
are the result of four factors. First, it came to be recognized in the late 1990s that something 
more would be needed if the EU15 were to meet their common Kyoto obligations and that this 
additional measure would need to be adopted at the European level. Second, an EU-wide carbon 
tax was off the table since the proposal to enact one had failed in the 1990s in part because fiscal 
matters, unlike regulatory measures, require the unanimous agreement of all Member States. 
Third, the early experience with the U.S. SO2 trading system and the embrace of trading in the 
Kyoto Protocol made trading a logical approach. Fourth, the recognition of the lack of trading 
experience and the requisite trading infrastructure in Europe prompted the adoption of the trial 
period to provide these prerequisites. 
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There is now an abundant literature that reports, analyzes, evaluates, and criticizes the 
performance of the EU ETS.2 For the purpose of this paper, the key results are that a uniform 
price for CO2 exists across the system, that this price is taken into account in operating and 
investment decisions by most of the owners of affected facilities, and that the requisite trading 
infrastructure consisting of registries and procedures for monitoring, reporting, and verification 
are in place. In short, an effective mechanism for limiting GHG emissions in the covered sectors 
exists and it is being used to effect progressively more significant emission reductions. 
The rest of this paper addresses five important aspects of the EU ETS as a multinational 
system. In each section, the experience of the EU ETS is explained and the implications for 
constructing a global trading system are discussed. The first aspect concerns a novel contribution 
of the EU ETS, the partial and time-limited, first or “trial” trading period from 2005-07. The 
second aspect is the role of a central coordinating entity. The third and fourth aspects concern the 
related issues of club benefits and appropriate differentiation in the face of increasing stringency. 
The fifth and last aspect concerns a problem that hasn’t appeared: cross-border financial flows. 
The final section of the paper concludes. 
2. THE TRIAL PERIOD APPROACH 
The trial period of the EU ETS is a novel feature of cap-and-trade programs and it is one that 
commends itself for a gloal system. The prospect of a trial period and its rationale was stated in 
the EU Green Paper on greenhouse gas trading (European Commission, 2000).  
“As emission trading is a new instrument for environmental protection within the 
EU, it is important to gain experience in its implementation before the international 
emissions trading scheme starts in 2008.”  
Although formulated for the EU in the context of the Kyoto Protocol, this statement could 
apply equally to any nation that is adopting a cap-and-trade system as an instrument for limiting 
greenhouse gas emissions as part of a larger global system. Conversely, those already in a 
broader system might also consider a trial period advantageous for ensuring that the requisite 
infrastructure and experience are in place before an acceding country becomes a fully 
participating member.   
The trial period of the EU ETS is defined by two key characteristics. First, it precedes a more 
serious commitment and as the name suggests it is a rehearsal for the real thing. For the EU, the 
real thing was the First Commitment Period of the Kyoto Protocol, but in a broader context, the 
rehearsal could be for subsequent, full fledged participation in a global system. Second, the trial 
period was self-contained in that there could be no banking of allowances into the following 
period or borrowing of allowances from that period. The inability to bank or borrow between two 
periods virtually assured that the end of period price would be either zero, if abatement were 
                                                 
2 For more comprehensive reports, the reader is referred to the Symposium on the EU ETS in the initial issue of the 
Review of Environmental Economics and Policy (Ellerman and Buchner, 2007; Convery and Redmond, 2007; 
and Kruger et al., 2007); Convery, Ellerman and De Perthuis, 2008; and Ellerman and Joskow, 2008. 
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more than required to meet the trial period cap, or the penalty price in the opposite case.3 
Generally, such a feature would be considered a serious defect; however, if a trial period is 
needed to gain experience and to put the requisite monitoring, reporting, and enforcement 
infrastructure in place, restricting trading with what follows is more understandable. 
The problems that are likely to be encountered in setting up a cap-and-trade system should not 
be minimized. Institutionally, the Member States of the European Union must be considered 
more prepared and capable of implementing such a system than many of the prospective 
participants in a global system. Yet, there was no end of difficulties in setting up the system in 
Europe. The biggest problem was data at the installation level which was needed both for the 
allocation of allowances to covered installations and more importantly for setting an appropriate 
cap (Ellerman, Buchner and Carraro, 2007). For instance, the EU ETS turned out to have a 
surplus in the trial period largely because the baseline from which projections of business-as-
usual emissions were to be made was highly uncertain. In fact, an important benefit of the trial 
period was providing more reliable data on actual emissions for included installations. In the EU 
ETS, the verified emission reports for the first year, 2005, became the baseline by which the 
Commission judged the acceptability of proposed caps for the ensuing 2008-12 period.  
The trial period was even more important for the new East European Member States where 
the institutional preparation was arguably not as complete as among the EU15. This has been 
rightly raised as an important issue in considering the feasibility of a global trading system 
(Kruger et al., 2007). The data deficiencies in Eastern Europe were greater than they were for the 
EU15 and most of the East European governments required more time to set up the requisite 
infrastructure for trading and enforcement. Poland’s registry did not go on line until eighteen 
months after the start of the EU ETS; and Romania and Bulgaria, who became participants in the 
trial period in its last year, did not have everything in place in time to participate effectively in 
trading in 2007.  
One of the most encouraging aspects of the trial period has been the evidence that participants 
and governments in countries with less institutional capacity can acquire the requisite 
infrastructure and become full fledged participants in a few years. Trial periods would seem to be 
a good way to develop the requisite infrastructure and procedures for later full-fledged 
participation in a global system and to reassure existing participants that the acceding country 
has this capability.  
The importance of the EU ETS’ trial period concerns not only the creation of the requisite 
trading infrastructure, but also coverage. While an economy-wide, comprehensive system that 
would include all sources is an ideal that may be practicable in some instances, the reality is 
more likely to be that the power sector and large industrial facilities are the most promising 
candidates for early inclusion in a global system.  
                                                 
3 Recall that the final net position is known with certainty only after it is too late to correct any imbalance. The 
requirement to cover and the incentive to sell non-bankable surpluses will ensure a price discovery process 
between the end of the compliance period and the surrender date that will reveal this binary outcome. 
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This was the case in the EU ETS. In keeping with trial period thinking and the recognition of 
the problems involved in setting up a system, it was proposed from the beginning to start with 
those sectors where a trading system could be most easily implemented. The already existing 
Large Combustion Plant and Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control Directives provided a 
regulatory framework that could be used (European Commission, 2000) and those directives 
already implied control of GHGs and energy efficiency, albeit by other means.4 This is not 
unlike the situation in developing economies where power plants and large industrial facilities 
are invariably those first subject to pollution controls.  
Moreover, for those already in a global system seeking to extend its reach and to reduce 
global GHG emissions, the arguments for initial partial coverage will be strong. The power 
sector is often the largest source of emissions in a country and inclusion of large industrial 
sources will be highly desirable to avoid leakage and to lessen competitive concerns on the part 
of nations already participating in the global system. Initial partial coverage need not preclude a 
later more comprehensive system, although the issue will be whether an initial partial approach 
makes it more difficult to arrive ultimately at comprehensive coverage.  
Expansion of coverage over time is clearly foreseen in the EU ETS and it has occurred. Opt-in 
provisions were included in the original Directive and a number of sources and even some other 
gases have been opted in, although the numbers are small. A more significant inclusion is 
aviation. The Commission’s proposal of 2006 to include the aviation sector in the EU ETS has 
been substantively approved by the necessary EU institutions. As of 2012 the EU ETS will 
expand to include in-flight emissions for all flights originating or terminating in the EU, 
including those for which the origin or destination is a non-EU country. In addition, the proposed 
post-2012 amendments to the ETS Directive would include chemicals and aluminum, two 
industrial sectors initially excluded, and there are provisions for domestic projects.5  Finally, the 
proposed mandatory, separate national caps over non-ETS emissions have led to proposals for 
EU-wide trading in the non-ETS sectors (Point Carbon, 2008). 
 The trial period of the EU ETS has demonstrated once again that rehearsal for the real thing 
has merit. Although not envisaged as a feature of a global trading system, similarly constructed 
trial experiences would seem to be a desirable feature, particularly when questions exist 
concerning the institutional readiness of newly acceding nations. For many of the same reasons 
as prevailed in the EU ETS, initial coverage would seem likely to be partial for newly 
participating members of a global system. Expanding sectoral coverage will be no easier than 
                                                 
4 The ETS Directive explicitly amends the Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control Directive to prohibit any 
Member State from establishing a GHG emission limit for any plant included in the EU ETS and it states that 
Member States are allowed to forego imposing energy efficiency requirements on plants included in the EU 
ETS. 
5 “Domestic projects” is the term that has evolved in the EU ETS to designate emission reduction projects within the 
EU but in sectors not included in the EU ETS. These would be analogous to the “external” projects now covered 
by the Clean Development Mechanism and be identical to the Joint Implementation projects that now exist in the 
New Member States in sectors not included in the EU ETS. 
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expanding geographic scope, but in both instances failing to obtain the ideal initially is no reason 
not to achieve what is practicable.   
3. DEFINING THE CENTER 
Kruger et al. (2007) note that “the model of decentralization in the EU ETS has broken new 
ground in our experience with emissions trading regimes across multiple jurisdictions.” Cap-
setting, allocation, monitoring, reporting, verification, registries, and enforcement are all the 
responsibilities of the constituent Member States, albeit with varying degrees of guidance, 
review and approval by the European Commission. Among the most important issues is the role 
and identity of the center in such systems. The EU ETS during the trial period offers one 
example of what can work.  
In considering the role of the center in the EU ETS, it is important to avoid the caricature of 
the European Commission as the over-staffed and over-bearing bureaucracy that is slowly but 
surely snuffing out national prerogative and diversity. While the Commission enjoys the power 
of initiative with respect to EU legislation and the duty to ensure that the existing EU laws are 
observed by Member States, the ultimate decision-making institution is the European Council of 
Ministers, which represents the governments of the Member Nations.6 In the end, the 
Commission is the agent of the whole and its success depends on both the powers granted to it by 
the still sovereign Member States and the manner in which those powers are exercised. In the 
case of the EU ETS, a careful distinction must be made between the role played by the 
Commission in the just completed trial period and the ongoing evolution and debate over that 
role.    
3.1 The Commission’s Role in the Trial Period 
The ETS Directive is unusual as an EU directive in endowing the Commission with specific 
and carefully circumscribed functions that are additional to its general powers as an executive 
agent under the European Treaties.7 The most important of these specific functions concerns the 
National Allocation Plans (NAPs) in which Member States determine the total number of 
allowances to be created and how they will be distributed. The Commission is given the power to 
review and to reject NAPs within a limited period of time after their notification to the 
Commission. This power proved to be important. Without it, the final EU-wide cap in both 
periods would have been higher by about 15% in the first period and 10% in the second period. 
Not surprisingly, the Commission’s power to review and to reject is carefully circumscribed. 
NAPs are to be assessed against specific provisions and a set of criteria in the ETS Directive, 
which is to say, as agreed previously by the Member States meeting in Council. A committee of 
Member State representatives was also established in the Directive to provide their opinion to the 
Commission on the NAPs submitted by Member States.  
                                                 
6 A succinct summary of the roles of EU institutions and how decisions are made in the European Union can be 
consulted at: http://europa.eu/institutions/decision-making/index_en.htm. 
7 Most directives are simply ‘transposed’ into national law with the Commission’s role limited to ensuring 
conformity of the national laws with the EU directive. 
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The Commission exercised its power to review and to reject with considerable discretion. In 
practice, it focused on three criteria (out of eleven): the Member State total (to guard against cap 
inflation), the list of installations with their allocations (to ensure inclusiveness), and the absence 
of ex post adjustments in allocation.8 Equally important was what the Commission chose not to 
insist upon. Despite appeals for a more “harmonized” approach, allocation to installations was 
left sensibly to the individual Member States. The committee process established by the 
Directive also proved useful in letting Member States know how others viewed its NAP and 
thereby enabled the Commission to perform its role as agent of the whole more effectively 
(Zapfel, 2007). Finally, no NAP was formally rejected. Instead an expedient of “conditional 
approval” and “approval with technical changes” was devised whereby the NAP was approved 
conditional on the adoption of certain changes, which usually had been previously negotiated 
out-of-sight. When the process for the first period was over, all of the Commission’s required 
changes had been accepted; and only two Member States, Germany and the UK, took the 
Commission to court on relatively technical matters.  
The assessment of National Allocation Plans of Member States was not the only significant 
function that the Commission performed in the trial period. Equally important were its efforts to 
educate, facilitate, and coordinate participation by Member States. Zapfel (2007) describes the 
“active role” that the Commission took “to assist and guide” Member States in the preparation of 
their NAPs and in eliminating “know-how gaps” in order to make informed decisions on 
technical issues. This involved commissioning studies on various aspects of allocation, issuing a 
non-paper elaborating how to prepare an allocation plan, and developing amplifying guidance on 
the review criteria. In addition, the Commission was always available and frequently sought after 
as a source of information, expertise, and informal guidance. The frequency and intensity of 
these bilateral contacts provided a means for sounding out various NAP features, narrowing 
differences, and facilitating final agreement.  
3.2 The Evolution of the Commission’s Role  
The first round of cap-setting could best be described as a negotiation between individual 
Member States and the Commission in which both sides were trying to agree on a mutually 
agreeable cap in the face of the large data uncertainties and some confusion over what 
installations met the definition for inclusion. Moreover, the absence of any international 
obligation to limit GHG emissions in these years allowed a more relaxed approach to cap-setting.  
All of this would change in the second round of NAP submissions for 2008-12 corresponding 
to the First Commitment Period under the Kyoto Protocol. Things were more serious with what 
the EU regarded as a legally binding obligation; and the definitional issues concerning who was 
in and out had been largely resolved by the time the NAP notifications were due in June 2006. 
                                                 
8 What became the Commission’s effective ban on ex post adjustment presents an interesting use of discretion. At 
best, this ban is implicit in the ETS Directive. Ex post adjustment would have frustrated the creation of an 
efficient EU-wide emissions market by substituting an administrative redistribution of allowances within each 
Member State for trading among installations. 
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But the most important factor in changing the Commission’s approach was the release in May 
2006 of the verified emissions data for 2005, which revealed lower emissions than had 
previously been thought to be the case. Despite the significant reductions in proposed totals that 
the Commission had required, it became evident that the totals for some Member States, mostly 
in Eastern Europe, had involved significant errors in assumed baseline emissions. As a result, the 
point of reference for Member State caps in the 2008-12 would no longer be the first period 
totals but 2005 verified emissions. And, in response to criticism of inconsistency and lack of 
transparency in the negotiation of Member State caps in the first round, the Commission adopted 
a single and carefully calibrated emissions model to project BAU emissions in 2010, the 
midpoint of the second trading period, based on the 2005 verified emissions data and expected 
rates of economic growth and of improvement in carbon intensity (European Commission, 
2006).  
The interaction between the Commission and the Member States assumed a different tone. 
Cap-setting was no longer a negotiation, but an evaluation of whether the totals proposed by 
Member States were consistent with the model’s projections based on the 2005 verified 
emissions. If they were not, the totals were adjusted downward absent a good reason and 
evidence concerning an error in the Commission’s calculations. In so doing, the Commission 
effectively determined Member State maximum allowed caps and thereby the EU-wide cap. 
Member States might challenge the Commission’s decision of what the cap should be, but the 
burden of proof was shifted heavily against the Member State. This approach did yield more 
legal challenges to the Commission’s NAP decisions. Nine of the ten East European countries 
have sued the Commission over the caps imposed on them, although one, Slovakia, withdrew its 
suit after a slight upward adjustment in its total. 
The trend to greater centralization was taken much farther in the post-2012 amendments that 
were proposed in January 2008 and are now under active debate. The whole NAP process is to 
be abandoned and the EU-wide cap will be determined in the Directive. Auctioning will become 
the standard for distribution of the cap with 100% auctioning to occur for the electric utility 
sector starting in 2013 and free allocation to the industrial sources to be phased out by 10% 
increments from 80% in 2013 to none in 2020. The only exception will be for sectors exposed to 
international trade that might receive a continuing free allocation if serious trade effects or 
leakage can be demonstrated.  
3.3 Questions for a Global System  
The experience with the EU ETS suggests that over-arching treaties and agreements, such as 
the Kyoto Protocol and the European Burden-sharing Agreement, may not be enough to create 
an effective cap-and-trade system. Assuming the political will or other motives supporting 
action, some entity must act as agent for the whole and educate, facilitate, and coordinate, 
hopefully with the vision, ability and political realism that have characterized the Commission’s 
role in the development of the EU ETS. That experience also raises two questions: Is the greater 
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degree of centralization now being pursued necessary in a global system? And who would play 
the role of the center on a global stage? 
Within Europe, the view is that the trial period was deeply flawed and that greater 
centralization is the remedy. In part this view reflects a vision of a more unitary state that could 
avoid the messiness of decentralized structures, but it also reflects some of the real problems of 
the trial period. Yet, despite the high degree of decentralization, the trial period did succeed in 
imposing a price on CO2 emissions over about half of the emissions in Europe and in creating a 
mechanism for effecting greater reductions in the future. The question for a global system, as 
well as for the EU ETS, is not so much what degree of centralization is desirable, but what is 
politically feasible. What may be possible in the European Union will not likely be so for a 
broader global system in which participating nations will retain significant discretion in deciding 
national emission caps, separate national registries will be maintained, and monitoring, reporting 
and verification procedures will be administered nationally. For this, the trial period of the EU 
ETS provides a good precedent  
The more difficult question is: What institution could assume on a larger global stage the 
functions that the Commission performed in the trial period? In many ways, the Commission’s 
role in establishing the EU ETS was accidental. It was not set up for this purpose; yet it was there 
when the occasion demanded and it played the role brilliantly. It can do so for further accessions 
within Europe and it would likely represent the EU in any future negotiations with trading 
systems in the United States or elsewhere. Nevertheless, the European Commission cannot serve 
as the center for a system that extends beyond Europe. Perhaps some entity will emerge out of 
negotiations to link the EU ETS with other systems, much as the WTO grew out of the expansion 
of trade, but there should be no doubt that some center will be needed. Otherwise the result will 
be a far more disjointed and dysfunctional system than what the trial period of the EU ETS is 
sometimes portrayed as being, or none at all.  
4. IMPORTANCE OF CLUB BENEFITS 
It is not the case that all Member States of the EU were equally resolved to address climate 
change from the beginning and that all are happy with the resulting EU ETS. The UK and 
Germany, the two largest members of the EU, advocated a voluntary trading system for the trial 
period in order to preserve the precursor voluntary arrangements in these countries. Spain, Italy, 
and some other EU15 states committed to targets in the European Burden-sharing Agreement 
that seem to have been viewed as aspirations and not as hard numbers to be achieved by later 
climate policy. Finally, the East European Member States, who joined after the system had been 
designed, had other priorities and with the exception of Slovenia faced no problems in meeting 
their commitments under the Kyoto Protocol. That the final result should be a mandatory trial 
period with all participating is surprising, not least in the European Union where various forms 
of exception are the rule. Club benefits, the advantages that go along with membership in some 
group, largely explain the result. 
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The story behind this surprising result has been told elsewhere (Skaerseth and Wettestad, 
2008), but several elements are important from the standpoint of constructing a larger global 
system. The story is a little different for the EU15 and the New Member States. For the EU15, a 
longer experience of working together and a set of prior commitments were important in shaping 
the result. The EU had taken a prominent position in favor of action on climate change at and 
subsequent to the Rio de Janeiro Conference in 1992 and a leadership position in global climate 
change policy had wide-spread public support, especially after the withdrawal of the U.S. from 
the Kyoto Protocol in 2001. The governments of the UK and Germany might advocate voluntary 
participation in the trial period, in large part due to the strong positions taken by their respective 
industries, but neither government would have been willing to scuttle the deal given their 
existing positions on climate change and their broader interests in the EU. As it was, agreement 
on mandatory free allocation and a temporary opt-out provision (and additionally on pooling for 
Germany) made mandatory participation by industry more palatable and gave the governments 
the excuse they needed to drop their insistence on a voluntary trial period.9 Southern Member 
States (Spain, Portugal, Italy, and Greece), who could be best characterized earlier as going 
along with the climate policy advocacy of their more northern neighbors, were too enmeshed in 
the broad benefits of the EU to give serious consideration to ignoring the EU ETS Directive, 
although for a while it looked as if Greece and Italy might do so.  
The situation was quite different for the New Member States. They were not part of the 
Burden Sharing Agreement and, with the exception of Slovenia, none faced any problems in 
meeting its Kyoto Protocol obligation. They had lower per capita income and lower demand for 
environmental protection, especially for a global problem. Finally, they were not present at the 
table as voting members when the ETS was negotiated and agreed. When accession became a 
reality, the common East European reaction to the EU ETS was that it was designed by and for 
the EU15 and that its provisions did not really fit the circumstances of the New Member States 
(Jankowski, 2007; Chmelik, 2007; Bart, 2007). The Directive was, as characterized by 
Jankowski, “an ill-fitting suit,” which all agreed nonetheless to wear amid much and continuing 
protest.  
Notwithstanding this discontent, none of the unhappy New Member States has pursued their 
differences to the point of withdrawing from the EU ETS. The first period NAP cuts were 
accepted without more than complaint; and, while the second period cuts have been followed by 
serious legal challenges to the Commission, the appeal for equitable treatment is being pursued 
through common European institutions and the plaintiff countries are participating in the trading 
scheme on the Commission’s terms pending the outcome of their legal challenges. How these 
challenges will play out is anyone’s guess, but it is hard to imagine any of the plaintiffs leaving 
the trading system in the event of an adverse decision. Too much would be called into question. 
                                                 
9 Pooling refers to an arrangement whereby individual installations would joint together to form an entity that would 
be collectively responsible for reporting emissions and receiving and surrendering allowances on their behalf. It 
was anticipated that this arrangement would accommodate voluntary agreements in some sectors. In fact, there 
was little pooling. 
 12
More importantly, the continuing Eastern discontent will have some influence on the proposed 
amendments for the post-2012 system. The new Member States are now voting members and a 
solid phalanx of Eastern opposition would complicate obtaining a qualified majority in the 
European Council. But even here, the options are not exiting the system or seeing it collapse 
since the failure of the January 2008 amendments would mean only that the existing Directive 
continues without amendment. 
The dissonance between the official positions of the governments of the New Member States 
and their actions can only be explained by the broader benefits of belonging to the European 
Union. Whatever the perceived disadvantages of mandatory participation in the EU ETS, they 
pale in significance when compared to the benefits of free flows of labor and capital and access 
to broader markets that come with being a member of the club called the European Union. As 
stated perceptively by Bart (2007), the EU ETS was “just another obligation in the long march to 
the EU.” The club benefits of the EU cannot be extended to the world, but similar side benefits 
are likely to be needed to induce and to maintain participation in a global system. 
5. STRINGENCY, DIFFERENTIATION & HARMONIZATION 
Club benefits largely explain how the EU ETS has grown from the initial fifteen Member 
States to the thirty that now participate. The continuing challenge will be to keep everyone in the 
system with the increasing stringency that would characterize any serious policy that attempts to 
deal with climate change. In particular, a conflict between two reasonable objectives—
differentiation and harmonization—has emerged and it will get worse with increasing stringency. 
This conflict will surely arise in a global system and that prospect imparts more than the usual 
interest to the resolution being attempted in the EU ETS. 
5.1 Differentiation and Harmonization Defined  
Differentiation is a well-established concept in climate policy originating with the reference to 
the “common but differentiated responsibilities” of nations in the UN Framework Convention on 
Climate Change. “Responsibilities” refers to the burdens, generally understood as costs, that 
would be assumed by countries of differing economic and historical circumstances. In a 
multinational trading system, differentiation would be expressed by the allowances assigned to a 
nation, as in the Kyoto Protocol or the EU ETS. Since these allowances are tradable and 
emission reductions will reflect marginal abatement costs that will tend to be equal for all, 
nations assuming greater responsibilities (e.g., lower caps) will typically incur a greater cost 
burden than nations with less demanding caps.  
Harmonization has entered the climate policy lexicon only with the implementation of the EU 
ETS, but the issue will occur in any global system. Harmonization is the proposed remedy—
presumably through a benchmarked allocation—for what is perceived as the unequal treatment 
of like facilities as the result of the decentralized free allocation of allowances. The allegation is 
that the award of more allowances to an installation in one country than to an identical 
installation in another is at least unfair and that it may create a competitive distortion. The call 
 13
for harmonization, which implicitly presumes equality of treatment, calls the whole concept of 
differentiation into question. If all facilities are to be treated equally, how can countries be 
differentiated? And, even if harmonization could be achieved for some particular sector, as 
several industries argue should be done in a global system, the burden of differentiation would 
then fall more heavily on the non-harmonized sectors.   
5.2 The Current and Proposed Evolution in the EU ETS 
The EU ETS is evolving from a trial period that could be characterized as little stringency, no 
differentiation and no harmonization to a post-2012 system that would feature increasing 
stringency, significant differentiation, and near complete harmonization. The lack of stringency 
in the trial period is well-known but the lack of differentiation is not. In theory, the trial period 
caps were to reflect the lesser of predicted business-as-usual emissions or a “Path to Kyoto” that 
was consistent with the Member State’s achievement of its emissions commitment under the 
European Burden-sharing Agreement (BSA). In reality, the absence of relevant data, the inherent 
difficulties of prediction, and the pressing deadlines for implementation frustrated any 
differentiation in the trial period as shown by Figure 1.  
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Figure 1. Relation of NAP1 Totals to Baseline Emissions and the Kyoto/BSA Targets. 
Source: Ellerman, Buchner, and Carraro (2007). 
This graph plots the trial period caps for ten representative Member States in relation to their 
Kyoto/BSA targets (horizontal axis) and to baseline or recent historical emissions for the ETS 
sectors (vertical axis). Countries to the left of the vertical axis, that is, those with a constraining 
Kyoto/BSA target, might be expected to have an EU ETS cap that would place them in the lower 
left-hand quadrant along the dashed diagonal. In fact, the caps of these countries look no 
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different than those of the countries to the right of the vertical axis.10 Recent emissions were a 
more important determinant of cap levels for the trial period of the EU ETS than the country’s 
prospective Kyoto/BSA targets. There was no systematic differentiation.  
This circumstance would change with the second NAP round (NAP2) that set caps for the 
2008-12 period. The over-all annual EU cap for 2008-12 was set at a level for the EU25 that was 
5% lower than 2005 verified emissions and 12% lower than the first period cap. Figure 2 shows 
the relationship between 2005 verified emissions (horizontal axis) and the second period caps 
(vertical axis) both expressed as ratios of the first period caps.  
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Figure 2. NAP2 caps in relation to NAP1 caps and 2005 emissions. Note: NAP1 and NAP2 
refer to the total EUAs that each Member State could allocation in the first and second 
trading periods. VE refers to verified emissions.  
Source: Compiled by the author. 
For nearly all Member States, both 2005 verified emissions and the second period caps are 
less than the first period caps. As is clearly evident from the plots and the diagonal, the lower a 
Member State’s 2005 verified emissions were from its first phase cap the lower its second phase 
cap would be. However, differentiation is starting to appear, as indicated by the perpendicular 
distance from the diagonal. Spain has the most demanding cap with 2005 emissions 6% above 
and a NAP2 total 17% below its first period total. Slovakia and Lithuania are those with the least 
demanding caps. More generally, New Member States are mostly to the northwest of this line, 
indicating less of a burden, while EU15 Member States are to the southeast indicating more of a 
burden. The separation between the two groups is not complete; however, there is differentiation 
as indicated by the larger diamonds marking the positions of the 10 New Member States (EU10) 
and the EU15, each taken as a whole. On average, the second period caps for the EU10 are 3% 
higher than 2005 emissions, while those for the EU15 are 7% less.  
                                                 
10  The UK took an explicit leadership position in the trial period by adopting early in the process a more demanding 
cap that it hoped would set an example for others. 
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Still greater stringency and greater differentiation is foreseen by the proposed post-2012 
amendments (European Commission, 2008). Starting in 2013 the cap is to be set at a level that it 
would decline by 1.74% annually indefinitely so that by 2020, it would be 21% below 2005 
verified emissions. At the same time, greater differentiation would be achieved by the 
apportionment of auctioned allowances to participating Member State governments according to 
a proposed formula. Ninety percent of the allowances to be auctioned would be allocated to 
Member States in proportion to their 2005 verified emissions. The remaining 10% would be 
distributed for the purpose of “solidarity and growth within the Community” to certain Member 
States in amounts that would increase the allowance allocation by percentages that range from 
2% for Italy to 56% for Latvia.  
As stated in the proposed amendments, the basis for this differentiation is GDP per capita: the 
same as has been proposed globally (Jacoby et al., 1999) and as noted in Frankel (2007) as 
underlying the targets in the Kyoto Protocol. Figure 3 shows the proposed post-2012 allocation 
of EU ETS allowances, assuming full auctioning, in relation to per capita income on a 
purchasing power parity basis.   
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Figure 3. 2020 auction rights in relation to 2005 emissions and per capita GDP. Source: 
Compiled by the author. 
The poorer East European countries—Bulgaria, Romania, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, 
Slovakia and Poland—would receive an allocation that would be equal to or greater than their 
level of 2005 emissions. In effect, the post-2012 cap would be little changed from the current 
2008-12 cap. Relatively better off New Member States would receive fewer allowances, but still 
more than any of the EU15. Among the latter, Luxembourg must be set aside because of the tax-
advantaged activity that gives it an artificially high per capita GDP. Otherwise, a clear leader 
group among the EU15 is evident: relatively high-income Member States that would receive 
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allowances equal to 71% of their 2005 emissions (90% of their share of a 2020 cap that would be 
21% below the 2005 level). 
The proposed post-2012 amendments also present a coherent attempt to deal with 
harmonization: 100% auctioning. When completely phased in, all will be treated alike with zero 
free allocation. This is not the benchmark that those advocating harmonization had in mind, but 
it is an easy and obvious one to administer. In this case, the auction advocates won the day, at 
least at the Commission, and among the benefits they could claim is the elimination of the 
alleged competitive distortions due to free allocation.  
Whether this approach will prevail is yet to be seen since the post-2012 amendments are still 
in the co-decision process. Nevertheless, the direction is clear. Harmonization will be achieved 
by doing away with free allocation. Perhaps there will not be 100% auctioning by 2020, or 100% 
in the power sector in 2013, but there will be significantly more from 2013 on and the share will 
likely continue to increase. In effect, French, German, or British installations will be buying 
some allowances (but not all) from Bulgaria and Romania, but the transfer will be well hidden by 
the intermediary of the market. This could work, even on a global scale, since all Member States 
would be auctioning a quantity of allowances that would constitute a significant share of their 
emissions. The real issues are whether 100% auctioning is politically feasible and if so, whether 
the better-off countries, which will be disadvantaged by differentiation, are willing to forsake the 
additional revenue. 
An equally important feature of the observed and proposed changes in the EU ETS is the 
coupling of increasing differentiation with increasing stringency. If a global approach is to be 
“broad then deep” (Schmalensee, 1998), the participants may find themselves in a situation not 
unlike that of the EU Member States. An initial broad phase, like the trial period of the EU ETS, 
will not require much differentiation; however, as the system enters the deep phase, 
differentiation will become an increasingly important issue. The EU ETS is attempting to work 
out the differentiation that will accompany greater stringency and to reconcile that solution with 
the demand for harmonization. How these difficult and interrelated issues are resolved in the EU 
ETS will provide a preview of the challenges awaiting a global system. 
6. FINANCIAL FLOWS 
Before concluding, note should be taken of the absence of a problem that is commonly 
thought to be one in a global trading regime. A trading system implies trade among participating 
entities and accompanying financial flows. And these flows are likely to be larger to the extent 
that differentiation creates differences in the apportionment of the system-wide cap that go in the 
same direction as comparative advantage in abatement. For instance, modeling exercises 
commonly predict that the cheapest abatement will be found in the same developing countries 
that most analyses assume will be the beneficiaries of global differentiation. These two factors 
would combine to create large international flows the feasibility of which can be doubted. A 
remarkable feature of the EU ETS is that there has been virtually no notice of the comparable 
cross border flows.  
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Despite all the birthing problems of the EU ETS, there was a very liquid market for EUAs and 
there were cross-border transfers among the participating Member States. The 25x25 matrix 
attached as an appendix provides a table of the country of origin of all the EUAs surrendered 
during the three years of the trial period. Reading across a row indicates the quantity and origin 
(by column headings) of all the allowances surrendered in the country listed at the row heading. 
The row sums indicate the total number of allowances surrendered, or equivalently emissions for 
that country during the three-year trial period and the percentage following indicates the number 
of EUAs surrendered in fulfillment of compliance obligations that were issued by other Member 
States. Reading down columns indicates the registry in which allowances issued by the country 
shown at the column heading were surrendered for compliance. Column totals indicate the 
number of issued EUAs that were surrendered throughout the EU ETS and the percentages 
below each sum indicate the proportion of the total that occurred outside of the issuing Member 
State. The diagonal entries indicate the number of allowances issued and surrendered in the same 
Member State. They are by far the largest entries of all cells for every Member State. 
Several points are immediately obvious. First, most of the allowances issued and surrendered 
were not involved in trade among Member States. Of the total 6.15 billion EUAs surrendered, 
5.79 billion (94%) were surrendered in the issuing Member State. International flows accounted 
for only 354 million EUAs or 5.8% of the total. Much of the explanation of this phenomenon 
reflects what could be expected and is readily observed with free allocation. Most of the 
allowances issued freely are kept in the installation’s account for later surrender against 
emissions. Typically, only the difference between the installation’s allocation and emissions is 
traded. These differences can now be measured. The sum of the shorts (emissions > allowances) 
for all installations for the entire trial period was 650 million EUAs and the sum of the longs 
(emissions < allowances) at installations with surplus EUAs was 810 million (Trotignon and 
Ellerman, 2008). At a minimum, 650 million allowances were redistributed from longs to shorts. 
This figure, slightly more than 10% of the total allowance issue, largely explains the relatively 
small scale of the international transfers.  
While the scale of international transfers is very modest in relation to total allowance issue, 
the scale is large compared to what would have been required to ensure the compliance of the 
four Member States that were short for the period as a whole: the UK, Italy, Spain, and Slovenia. 
For all installations to be in compliance in these four countries, at least 88 million tons would 
have had to flow across EU borders. The actual level was four times higher. Even if the many 
off-setting flows between trading pairs are eliminated, the sum of net flows is 217 million, some 
two and a half times the minimum required international transfer. If national preferences had 
been strictly observed, there would have been only four Member States importing allowances. In 
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fact, 22 of the 25 Member States were importers of EUAs in some amount, although only seven 
were net importers.11 
Another way of looking at this phenomenon is counting how many of off-diagonal cells in the 
matrix at the appendix are filled. There are 600 such cells of which 470 (78%) are occupied 
indicating a cross border transfer. For most pairings, trade goes both ways and for many Member 
States the net flows with various trading partners are in opposite directions. For instance, 
Germany is a net importer in the aggregate and in trading with most partners but it is a net 
exporter to the UK, Italy, and Spain.   
Market intermediaries and institutions largely explain the abundance of cross-border 
relationships. Installations with a deficit or a surplus looked to market intermediaries to obtain 
needed EUAs or to dispose of excess EUAs and these intermediaries operated at a European 
scale. A UK firm that had a surplus would sell to a broker or at an exchange and that surplus was 
as likely to be sold to a firm that was short in Spain as it was to a firm that was short in the UK. 
With EUAs good for compliance regardless of origin and zero transportation costs, the surpluses 
and deficits were as likely to cross a border as not.  
The absence of any concern about international flows can be largely attributed to their small 
scale relative to the total number of allowances and to the indifference that buyers and sellers 
exhibited concerning national origin. The UK was by far the largest importer of EUAs with a net 
import of 107 million for the period as a whole, which was equal to 14% of verified emissions. 
Placing a value on these imports is difficult given the variability in EUA prices and the observed 
timing of imports, but the year of greatest import in value terms was 2006 when EUA imports 
would seem to have created a £350 million pound (≈ €500 million) outflow of funds from the 
UK. While this might be seen as a large amount, it pales in comparison to the payments for 
imported goods and services by the UK in 2006 which were about £415 billion.12 Payments to 
foreigners for allowances were less than one-tenth of one percent of the total imported goods and 
services. The amount in future years could be larger due to higher EUA prices and perhaps 
higher levels of imports, but allowances would still be a small part of total payments abroad for 
goods and services. One euro-skeptic organization in the UK, for which the EU ETS is 
emblematic of all that it dislikes about Brussels, has consistently criticized the transfers to the 
rest of the EU that are implied by the UK’s short position (Open Europe, 2006), but this 
complaint failed to find any traction either with the public or the government. Several other 
aspects of the EU ETS have caught the attention of the public and governments—windfall 
profits, over-allocation, high initial prices—but not international flows.13  
                                                 
11 The net importers were the UK, Spain, Italy, Germany, Austria, Ireland, and Slovenia. Germany, Austria and 
Ireland were net importers despite being long for the period as a whole due to a phenomenon that occurred in all 
Member States: some surplus allowances at long installations appear never to have entered the market. See 
Trotignon and Ellerman (2008) for a more complete discussion. 
12 Given as U.S. $768 billion in IMF Statistics.  
13 For a more complete discussion of these other controversies, see Ellerman and Joskow (2008). 
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7. CONCLUSION 
Europe has demonstrated that a multinational trading system, consisting of sovereign nations 
with considerable disparities in economic circumstance and in willingness to adopt climate 
change measures, can be constructed. At the same time, that experience has identified the 
problems that exist in multinational systems and in so doing it has revealed the distance to be 
traveled in replicating something similar on a global scale.  
The encouraging aspect of the experience to date with the EU ETS is the evidence that some 
of the problems often cited as impeding a global system may not be that serious. The institutional 
disparities between East and West in Europe are not as great as those between North and South 
on the global scale, but they are still large. It took more time to put the necessary regulatory 
infrastructure of trading in place in Eastern Europe than it did in the West, but it was done and 
the companies in the New Member States are complying and increasingly learning to price CO2 
into their operational and investment decisions Although the EU ETS was not intended as an 
experiment for a global system, its adoption of a multi-year trial period has set a useful 
precedent. It provided a dress rehearsal that could be employed in a global system where the 
institutional readiness of new participants is a concern. 
Another problem that didn’t appear is concern over the financial flows that accompany 
international trading.  Most of the allowances issued by individual Members States were 
surrendered in the same country and the international transfers were a small percentage of the 
total, but they were larger than what might have been expected based on national preference. The 
widespread use of cross-border transfers for compliance reflects the role of intermediaries in an 
EU-wide market in redistributing the differences, which existed for all installations, between the 
allocations and their emissions. Surplus allowances were as likely to end up in another Member 
State as in the one in which the selling installation was located, and similarly allowances 
purchased to cover emissions were as likely to come from surpluses in other Member States as 
from other installations in the same country.  
The more discouraging aspect of the EU ETS as the prototype for a global system is how to 
reproduce what was essential for success in Europe, namely, a pre-existing central structure and 
a well established set of powerful side benefits. The European Commission cannot perform the 
same role, nor can the benefits of participation in the European Union be extended beyond 
Europe. One can imagine that a central institution could emerge out of bilateral agreements that 
might link the EU ETS with comparable systems outside of Europe. Something will be needed to 
coordinate regulatory actions, to review periodic cap adjustments, and to negotiate with new 
participants. It is harder to imagine what might be the side benefits. They need not be as 
powerful as those associated with becoming a member of the European Union, but the 
experience in Europe suggests that something more than over-arching treaty and common 
concern will be needed. This is however not a unique challenge. In diplomacy, issues are 
inevitably linked and the same will have to be done if there is to be a global climate regime. 
Differentiation of responsibilities might provide the extra incentive, but it has not in the Kyoto 
Protocol and the EU ETS did not operate this way. The first step was to get everyone in and then 
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to increase the stringency of the required emission reductions. A new complicating problem also 
appeared: harmonization of free allocations. The relationship between stringency, differentiation, 
and harmonization is the big unresolved issue for the EU ETS. The solution proposed and being 
debated, full auctioning with differentiation of rights to the auctioned allowances, comes close to 
being a common tax, but it has yet to be proven politically feasible. As in other aspects, the 
answers being worked out in Europe will say much about what will be possible on a broader, 
global scale. 
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APPENDIX: ORIGIN AND DISPOSITION OF SURRENDERED ALLOWANCES, 2005-07 (MILLION TONS) 
AT BE DK FI FR DE GR IE IT LU NL PT ES SE GB CY CZ EE HU LV LT MT PL RO SK SI Total Imports %
AT 91.63 0.20 0.11 0.20 0.52 1.03 0.00 0.05 0.83 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.26 0.30 0.00 0.03 0.14 0.13 0.42 0.31 0.02 96.27 4.64 1%
BE 0.21 148.38 0.17 0.12 0.96 0.80 0.01 0.04 0.95 0.38 0.23 0.08 0.75 0.03 0.08 0.46 0.17 1.49 0.01 0.66 6.89 0.07 162.92 14.54 4%
DK 0.00 0.15 72.62 0.15 0.10 0.65 0.01 0.85 0.11 0.15 0.21 0.37 0.43 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.08 0.11 76.09 3.47 1%
FI 0.20 0.11 0.06 114.34 0.87 0.22 0.25 0.07 0.15 0.14 0.03 0.34 0.78 0.93 0.26 0.02 0.06 0.21 1.09 0.10 120.24 5.90 2%
FR 0.01 0.07 0.04 0.29 379.71 0.15 0.12 0.07 0.13 0.07 0.43 0.02 0.26 0.04 0.25 0.02 0.12 1.73 0.13 383.67 3.96 1%
DE 0.48 4.02 0.87 2.83 6.72 1391.19 0.08 0.86 1.26 0.27 7.34 0.96 0.96 1.21 8.40 0.01 7.06 1.35 2.53 0.28 2.39 5.31 1.67 1448.08 56.89 16%
GR 0.02 0.01 0.06 0.00 212.91 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.84 0.02 213.93 1.03 0%
IE 0.08 0.02 0.06 0.29 0.12 0.06 64.04 0.19 0.01 0.09 0.18 0.02 0.00 0.43 0.02 0.06 0.56 0.04 0.03 0.06 0.03 66.38 2.33 1%
IT 0.46 1.18 0.66 1.07 6.45 5.42 0.26 0.09 629.12 0.01 1.16 1.19 1.54 0.57 4.13 0.23 3.68 2.05 1.08 0.85 1.14 6.83 2.84 0.05 672.06 42.94 12%
LU 7.88 7.88 0.00 0%
NL 0.12 2.98 0.27 0.79 2.30 2.84 0.08 0.02 0.15 0.02 216.80 0.08 0.38 0.23 2.72 0.05 1.79 0.58 0.38 0.23 0.75 2.44 0.93 0.00 236.94 20.14 6%
PT 0.01 0.15 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.04 99.44 0.28 0.00 0.46 0.22 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 100.84 1.40 0%
ES 0.27 1.68 2.47 3.77 5.92 3.47 0.13 0.13 1.05 0.10 3.74 3.32 499.67 0.91 4.69 0.01 3.54 1.06 1.13 0.56 0.74 8.21 1.64 548.22 48.55 14%
SE 0.01 0.03 0.07 0.36 0.09 0.19 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 57.05 0.18 0.08 0.15 0.00 0.01 0.08 0.12 0.01 58.46 1.41 0%
GB 0.41 10.09 4.69 5.11 20.59 11.29 1.17 0.16 3.45 0.26 18.52 1.78 2.60 1.20 619.10 0.14 13.83 5.29 2.81 0.75 5.40 17.76 4.33 750.72 131.62 37%
CY 15.73 15.73 0.00 0%
CZ 0.00 0.08 0.07 0.04 0.07 0.12 0.12 0.26 0.23 0.03 0.07 0.96 0.01 247.03 0.11 0.48 0.01 0.10 2.02 0.61 252.42 5.39 2%
EE 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.02 39.94 0.04 40.05 0.11 0%
HU 0.01 0.14 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.15 0.04 78.63 0.24 0.02 0.00 79.30 0.67 0%
LV 0.03 0.00 8.55 0.06 0.00 8.64 0.09 0%
LT 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.39 0.18 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.02 17.98 0.39 0.01 19.13 1.15 0%
MT 3.96 3.96 0.00 0%
PL 0.04 0.18 0.10 0.00 0.26 0.20 0.02 0.00 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.09 0.01 0.62 0.01 0.17 0.00 0.08 0.04 0.02 620.34 0.25 622.53 2.19 1%
RO 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.18 0.13 0.23 0.01 0.18 0.01 0.74 0.04 0.25 0.07 1.37 55.24 0.03 0.03 58.65 3.41 1%
SK 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.22 0.02 0.08 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.07 0.10 0.01 0.11 0.20 0.17 74.30 75.37 1.07 0%
SI 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.40 0.00 0.02 0.09 0.02 0.06 0.04 0.19 0.02 0.07 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.19 0.00 25.37 26.61 1.24 0%
Total 93.99 169.42 82.36 129.40 425.61 1418.40 215.23 65.47 636.74 8.94 250.53 107.66 507.06 62.14 643.75 16.25 280.83 51.78 89.05 11.73 30.13 3.96 676.55 55.24 87.44 25.49 6145.13 354.16 100%
Exports 2.36 21.03 9.74 15.07 45.90 27.21 2.32 1.42 7.62 1.06 33.73 8.21 7.39 5.09 24.65 0.52 33.79 11.84 10.42 3.18 12.15 0.00 56.22 0.00 13.14 0.11 354.16
% 1% 6% 3% 4% 13% 8% 1% 0% 2% 0% 10% 2% 2% 1% 7% 0% 10% 3% 3% 1% 3% 0% 16% 0% 4% 0% 100%
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Source: Trotignon and Ellerman (2008). Note: units in million EUAs 
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